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RECENT DECISIONS
to the insurer, that construction will be adopted which favors the liability of the
insurer for the act or default in question. 5 Couch, Insurance 4327 (1929). The
terms of these bonds have generally been found "unequivocal in their nature" and
"unambiguous." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.First National
Bank, 103 F2d
977 (3rd Cir. 1939); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Barber,70 F2d 220.
(6th Cir. 1934).
It has been argued that in view of the fact that an employee's defalcation in
a previous year had exhausted the insurer's liability as to him, premiums were paid
in subsequent years with no compensatory return. In answer it is pointed out that
the insured is still at an advantage in that it is not necessary for him to prove that
the loss took place in any particular year so long as it can be established that it was
within the time the bond was in force; and further that the Discovery Period is
extended by each annual premium. See Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
80 F2d 205 (4th Cir. 1935).
The result of the instant case is unfortunate in that an insured may find
himself at a distinct disadvantage if be deals with the same company instead of
changing insurers each year; and moreover an insurer which receives a given
premium over a three year period from one insured accepts only one-third the
exposure that it would have if it received the same amount of premium income
from three insureds in one year. However the function of the court here was not
to create a new contract for the parties, but rather to interpret the existing contract
to which the parties had agreed.
Robert J. Blaney
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ORDINANCE RESTRICTING DOOR TO DOOR
SALES HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Appellant, engaged in soliciting magazine subscriptions for a Pennsylvania
corporation, was convicted for violation of an ordinance of the City of Alexandria,
La., which made it a misdemeanor for solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant
merchants or transient vendors of merchandise to go upon private residences
without first having been requested to do so. Appellant claimed that the ordinance
was invalid in that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that it was a burden on interstate commerce;
and that it violated the guarantee of the First Amendment of "freedom of press"
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
in affirming the conviction held that the ordinance was not a violation of the Due
Process Clause nor did it burden interstate commerce, and that the "freedom of the
press" is not absolute, nor does it give one the right to invade the privacy and
repose of the inhabitants of a city that has passed an ordinance to giv,' ;ts
citizens
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protection from the nuisances perpetrated by itinerants. Breard v. City of Alexandria,La., 71 S. Ct. 920, (1951).
The business operations of the itinerant merchant are not immune to local
regulation because of the Federal Commerce Clause. An absolute prohibition.
against house to house peddlers of commercial articles (brushes), whether they be
from within or without the State, was held a valid exercise of the State police power
and not an undue restriction on interstate commerce when its purpose is to protect
the privacy of the home dweller from the nuisances perpetrated by such peddlers.
Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. 2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). However, the itinerant's constitutional guarantees under the First Amendment have
been zealously guarded by the Courts from any serious restriction by local ordinance. It has been held that an ordinance, which is designed to protect the home
owner from the disturbances created by house to house peddlers, and which
provides that such peddlers shall have a license before they can proceed from house
to house is unconstitutional and does violate the constitutional rights of "free
speech," "free press,' and "freedom of religion" as applied to peddlers of religious
periodicals. Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1941); iMurdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943).
In 1943, the City of Struthers, Ohio, had in effect an ordinance which flatly
prohibited individuals from passing handbills, circulars, or other advertisements
from door to door. The ordinance was intended to protect privacy, to secure to
the city's citizens freedom from the disturbances created by such peddlers with
their door-knocking and bell-ringing. A Jehovah's Witness peddling circulars
advertising a religious meeting was arrested and convicted under the provisions of
this ordinance. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was
invalid in that it violated the rights of "free speech," "free press," and "freedom of
religion" as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Martin v. City of Struthers,
Ohio, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
In the instant case, an ordinance to abate the nuisances of house to house
peddlers is upheld against the claims of a magazine vendor that his constitutional
guarantee of "free press" is violated. The Court has preferred to treat the material
distributed as being in the same commercial category as the brushes which were
sold in the Green River case. This treatment is not too convincing in view of the
decisions reached in cases involving newspapers. Newspapers, which for the most
part have as their main source of support paid advertisements and which are
printed for profit, have not lost the freedom of the press guaranteed them by the
First Amendment and protected further by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
The First Freedom, by Morris Ernst. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52
(1941) for arguments as to what constitutes a political handbill or an advertising
circular. In the past, the Courts have been very suspicious of legislation which
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tended to restrict circulation of published matter, whether the legislation was
passed under the guise of the state taxing power or the state police power. See
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); and Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697 (1931).
The First Amendment guarantees the right of the individual to express his
views as to current issues and controversies. One of the main organs for such
expression is the national magazine. There the reader finds editorial comment,
letters to the editors, portraits of men in public office and general political argumentation. See current issues of Newsweek, Collers, The Atlantic Monthly and
Time. The fact that these magazines are printed for profit as well as for the
dissemination of political information should not make them any less protected
than a pamphlet distributed on religious matters, see Struthers case, supra, at
least where the conflicting right involved is that of the right of the individual's
privacy in his own home.
It is submitted that perhaps the decision in the instant case can best be understood if viewed with the Court's extended interest in preserving the privacy of the
individual. The Green River type ordinance, although it affects interstate commerce, is upheld as a valid exercise of the state police power when such ordinance
is designed to provide to the home owner a privacy uninterrupted by house to
house peddlers of varied house-hold articles. Town of Green River v. Fuller
Brush Co.. supra. A blanket denial to all of the use of sound amplifying devices
on the city's streets does not contravene the rights of "free speech," and "free
press" if such denial is intended to protect the citizens from the annoyances of loud
noises. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.77 (1948).
In the instant case, the Court has taken another step in the recognition of the
citizen's right of privacy. The Court has now ruled that the constitutional guarantee
of "free press" which is not absolute, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158
(1944), must also give way to the right of the citizen to be free from invasions of
his privacy.
Joseph A. Taddeo

FEDERAL PRACTICE-DEPENDENT CLAIM DISMISSED ON FAILURE OF
FEDERAL CLAIM
A patent was issued on a removable shoulder pad for use in women's dresses.
The patentee (plaintiff here) entered into an agreement with the defendant in
this action whereby the latter was to have the use of the patent, if valuable, and in
return would compensate the patentee for such use. The defendant used the device,
but has failed to make payment. The United States Court of Appeals, Second

